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In a six-week period in August and September 1862,
Minnesota was the scene of the most violent and bloody conflict
2
between Indians and white settlers since the colonial period. As
many as 600 or more white settlers (some contemporary estimates
put it at 1000), a few hundred soldiers, and somewhere between
100 (or less) and 300 Indians—almost all members of the Dakota
3
Nation (called Sioux at the time)—died in this conflict. At the
time political and military leaders in Minnesota asserted that at
least 1000 whites died. While this number may be an exaggeration,
the fact that most white leaders believed the death toll was this high
raised emotions and increased demands for executions of the
Dakota. Another 300 or so Indians would die in the aftermath,
some through execution, but many more through harsh conditions
in post-conflict confinement.
Following the restoration of peace, General Henry Hastings
Sibley appointed a military commission, which tried 393 Indians for
4
“crimes” connected to the conflict. The trials began on September
28, and by November 5 the military commission had convicted 323
of the men who were tried. The commission sentenced 303 men to
death and provided lesser punishments for twenty others, who were
convicted only of looting, but were not involved in any combat or
attacks on white settlers. Even before the trials were over, President
Abraham Lincoln exercised his authority, and his obligation, under

2. More Indians died in the Second Seminole War and the Red Stick Creek
war, but these were essentially conflicts between the military and Indians, rather
than Indian-settler conflicts.
3. David A. Nichols, The Other Civil War: Lincoln and the Indians, MINN. HIST.
MAG., Spring 1974, at 8. Estimates of the dead vary from 400 to 800 (or more)
white civilians and another 200 or so soldiers. CURTIS A. DAHLIN, THE DAKOTA
UPRISING: A PICTORIAL HISTORY 1 (2009) (“Estimates of the number of whites killed
vary widely, with 600 being a conservative estimate.”). Many sources estimate
Dakota deaths at 300, although this may be way too high. Carol Chomsky, citing a
1923 account of the events, puts the deaths at “77 American soldiers, 29 citizensoldiers, approximately 358 settlers, and an estimated 29 Dakota soldiers.” Carol
Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 13, 21–22 (1990). Chomsky also cites another source for fewer Dakota
killed. Id. at 21 n.50. I believe that Chomsky’s figures, at least for the deaths of
settlers, are far too modest.
4. There is large literature on the violence in Minnesota, but very little of it
focuses on the trials, and even less on the pardons. For the best work on the legal
aspects of the trials, see Chomsky, supra note 3, and Maeve Herbert, Explaining the
Sioux Military Commission of 1862, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 743 (2009). On
Dakota-white relations from the seventeenth century to the outbreak in 1862, see
generally GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON, KINSMEN OF ANOTHER KIND (1984).
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5

the Militia Act of 1862, ordering that no executions could take
6
place without his approval. On November 8, Major General John
Pope, Commanding General of the Department of the Northwest,
7
forwarded the list of those sentenced to death to Lincoln.
Much to the shock of the military and civilian leaders in
Minnesota, the President did not rubber-stamp these convictions
and sentences. Instead, on November 10, Lincoln asked General
Pope to “[p]lease forward as soon as possible the full and complete
8
record of their convictions.” Lincoln further told Pope to “have a
careful statement” indicating “the more guilty and influential of the
9
culprits.” News of Lincoln’s response led Minnesota Governor
Alexander Ramsey to immediately weigh-in with his “hope” that
“the execution of every Sioux Indian condemned by the military
10
court will be at once ordered.”
The next day General Pope assured Lincoln he would forward
the record, although in fact it would not arrive until the end of the
11
month.
Meanwhile, Pope lobbied the President to allow the
executions to go forward. Even before Lincoln could see the

5. Militia Act of 1862, Ch. CCI, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598 (“And no sentence of
death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be carried into execution until
the same shall have been approved by the President.”).
6. On October 17, Major General John Pope told General Henry Hastings
Sibley, “The President directs that no executions be made without his sanction.”
Letter from John Pope to Henry Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in LINCOLN AND THE
INDIANS, supra note 1, at 96.
7. Message of the President of the United States in Answer to a Resolution of the
Senate of the 5th Instant in Relation to the Indian Barbarities in Minnesota: Hearing on S.
Exec. Res. 7 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 37th Cong. 1 (1862) (statement of
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States) [hereinafter Message of the
President], available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/senate
-executive-document-no-7-from-1862.pdf. For copies of the original telegraph
dispatch, dated November 8, 1862, see List of 300 Sioux Sentenced to Death,
MDEWAKANTON REFERENCE SITE (Jan. 29, 2007, 5:13 PM), http://mdenney.
proboards.com/index.cgi?board=indianprisoners &action=print &thread=273. To
view the first of the twenty pages of names of those sentenced to death, see
http://i83.photobucket.com/albums/j299/mdenney100/xx/LIST%20OF%20300
%20SIOUX%20SENTENCED%20TO%20DEATH/p1-1.jpg (last visited Nov. 24,
2012).
8. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John Pope (Nov. 10, 1862), in 13 U.S.
WAR DEPT. ET AL., THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 787 (1885) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES].
9. Id.
10. Letter from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1862), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8.
11. Message of the President, supra note 7, at 1.
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evidence, Pope assured him that “the only distinction between the
culprits is as to which of them murdered most people or violated
most young girls. All of them are guilty of these things in more or
12
less degree.” After reflecting on the issue, Pope then sent the
President a telegram suggesting an alternative to Lincoln executing
the Sioux under federal law. The general suggested that “the
13
Criminals be turned to the State Govt to be dealt with.” At the
end of the month, Governor Ramsey made a similar offer, telling
the President, “[i]f you prefer it turn them over to me & I will
14
order their Execution.” Both the General and the Governor were
desperate to see the Indians executed by some authority. Neither
understood that Lincoln’s concerns for due process and fairness—
and his discomfort with needless killing—would not be eliminated
by substituting a state executioner for a federal hangman. Nor did
either man apparently understand that Lincoln was not the kind of
leader who would shift responsibility to someone else so he would
not have to make a distasteful decision.
Following Pope’s offer to hand the prisoners over the state, the
General and the Governor tried to pressure Lincoln to approve the
executions. They warned him that if he did not order the
immediate execution of the Indians there would be “[p]rivate
15
revenge,” and an “indiscriminate massacre of all the Indians—old
16
men, women, and children.” Meanwhile, Lincoln learned from
newspapers and letters that in Minnesota the general public was
enthusiastic about the mass hanging. The headline in one paper,
17
“DEATH TO THE BARBARIANS,” summarized the feelings of
most whites in the state.
Lincoln did not respond to the absurd notion that he shift the
responsibility for the Dakota prisoners to Governor Ramsey and
state authorities. Nor did he respond to the threats Pope and
12. Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788.
13. Telegraph from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in THE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, available at http://
memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/malhome.html [hereinafter THE ABRAHAM
LINCOLN PAPERS].
14. Telegraph from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 28, 1862),
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
15. Letter from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1862), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 787.
16. Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788.
17. Chomsky, supra note 3, at 29.
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Ramsey articulated or to the pressures from Minnesota newspapers.
Lincoln had seen so many newspaper attacks on him since he
began his run for the presidency that he probably was unaffected
by the wild harangues from the press in Minnesota. However, he
surely must have wondered why the major general he had
appointed to command the newly created Department of the
Northwest was incapable of preventing an unruly mob of civilians
from attacking the Indians who were in his custody. Lincoln might
also have wondered why Governor Ramsey was unable to keep the
peace among his own constituents. In the end, Lincoln would
18
pardon the vast majority of the convicted Dakota, despite the
pressure of his generals, the political leadership of the state, and
the public press.
While the hanging of the thirty-eight men was the largest mass
execution in American history, the decision to reprieve 265 men—
seven out of every eight who were condemned—constituted the
largest mass clemency of people sentenced to death in American
history. This article focuses on a narrow slice of these events: the
decision by President Lincoln to pardon about eighty-seven percent
of those who were condemned to die.
I.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE PARDON ISSUE

With the Civil War raging, almost all of Lincoln’s attention was
focused on defeating the Confederacy and preserving the Union.
19
With mounting Union army casualties exceeding 100,000, the fate
18. Technically Lincoln did not “pardon” any of the Dakota prisoners, but
merely refused to authorize their execution. However, at the time everyone
understood that these were pardons, and contemporaries used that term in
describing them. In reality, once the prisoners were reprieved, they were
effectively pardoned, and eventually released from custody. For use of the term
pardon, see for example, a letter in which Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt
told Lincoln that if he certified some of the convicted men to be executed it was
“merely an approval of the sentences, and a refusal to pardon.” Letter from
Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1862), in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS,
supra note 13.
19. “Casualties” refer to those killed, wounded, and missing. By the end of
1862 more than 15,500 U.S. soldiers had been killed in major battles (where there
were more than 500 casualties on the Union side), more than 69,000 U.S. soldiers
had been wounded, and more than 52,000 were missing or captured. See
FREDERICK PHISTERER, STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
213–15 (1883).
Tens of thousands of other soldiers had died or were
incapacitated from disease related to the war. Id. With high mortality rates from
wounds and disease many of those who had not died in battle would die later, as
would many who were captured and sent to Confederate POW camps. Id. A few
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of a few hundred Indians in Minnesota should not have been very
significant to Lincoln. If anything, Lincoln had as much reason as
the people in Minnesota to be furious at the Dakota who made war
on the United States. They had been living peacefully in the state,
they were reasonably well integrated into the society, and many of
20
them knew and regularly interacted with whites. Whatever their
grievances, murderous attacks directed mostly at innocent civilians
could hardly be justified.
The violence in Minnesota also threatened the larger security
of the nation. The acts of the Dakota warriors forced Lincoln to
devote troops, horses, arms, money, and time to pacify the frontier
when he desperately needed these military assets for the ongoing
war for the Union. In the end, the United States ended up
diverting only a few thousand troops to Minnesota, but when the
violence began, Lincoln had no idea how many troops he would
have to send there, and how long they would be there. Three days
after the violence in Minnesota broke out, the United States
suffered a humiliating defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run.
Lincoln faced a crisis in the military—not knowing who he should
choose for his new field commander, only knowing he had to get
rid of the defeated General John Pope. The Indian conflict in
Minnesota was an unanticipated complication for Lincoln that had
the potential to divert huge resources from the war against the
Confederacy. Initially, the administration feared the events in
Minnesota were part of a Confederate conspiracy to open up a new
21
front on the western frontier. Horace Greeley, the influential but
not always accurate editor of the New York Tribune, published an
unsigned editorial asserting that the Dakota were “stimulated if not
bribed to plunder and slaughter their White neighbors” by agents
22
“sent . . . by the Secessionists.”
Similarly, the New York Times
thousand more soldiers had been killed or wounded in smaller engagements,
including the battles in Minnesota. Id.
20. Chomsky, supra note 3, at 91–92. Chomsky further notes that many of
the Dakota had been interacting with white society and thus fully understood the
gravity of their offenses. Id. at 92. General Sibley asserted they were not “wild and
ignorant savages” who could be excused for behavior that offended American law
and culture. Id.
21. The Secretary of the Interior made such claims in his report to Congress
in December, 1862. See Report of the Secretary of the Interior, in 2 MESSAGE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, 37TH
CONG., 8–9 (1862).
22. Gerald S. Henig, A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising, MINN. HIST. MAG.,
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reported that the “Indians are in league with the rebels.” While
this proved not to be true, when the conflict began the
administration could not be certain that this was not a southern
conspiracy.
Even after the Dakota had been completely
suppressed, some people in the administration continued to
express fears that it was part of a Confederate conspiracy that might
break out again. On December 1, Secretary of the Interior Caleb
Smith reported to Congress that “the chief cause” of the events in
Minnesota “is to be found in the insurrection of the southern
24
25
States.”
Smith was certain that “southern emissaries” had
convinced the Dakota to go to war against the United States and
the settlers. In retrospect, we know these fears were completely
unfounded, but at the time some in the administration were fearful
that the events in Minnesota were tied to the larger Civil War.
Thus, the violence perpetrated by the Dakota clearly harmed not
just the people in Minnesota, but the whole nation.
There was yet one more complication caused by the outbreak
in Minnesota. At the time of the outbreak Lincoln had written the
preliminary emancipation proclamation and was waiting for a
decisive military victory to provide him with an opportunity to
26
announce his plans for ending slavery in the Confederacy. He
would not announce emancipation until he had a major military
victory in the East. Shifting troops and resources to Minnesota
could potentially have forced Lincoln to move troops—badly
needed in the East—to the West. The events in Minnesota were
not simply a distraction for the President; they threatened to
derail—or at least delay—a major policy shift. For Lincoln, this
outbreak on the Minnesota plains could hardly have come at a
worse time. In the end, the conflict in Minnesota did not require
as many troops as Lincoln feared; the administration needed only a
few thousand troops to defeat the Dakota. But, shifting troops to
Fall 1976, at 107, 109 (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1862, at 4).
23. Are the Indians Allies of the Rebels?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1862, at 4.
24. The Secretary of the Interior made such claims in his report to Congress
in December 1862. See Report of the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 21, at 8.
25. Id.
26. Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional
Change, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 349, 361–62. For further discussion on Lincoln’s plan
to announce the Emancipation Proclamation see Paul Finkelman, Lincoln and the
Preconditions for Emancipation: The Moral Grandeur of a Bill of Lading, in LINCOLN’S
PROCLAMATION: EMANCIPATION RECONSIDERED 13–44 (William A. Blair & Karen
Fisher Younger eds., 2009); see also LOUIS P. MASUR, LINCOLN’S HUNDRED DAYS:
THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE WAR FOR THE UNION (2012).
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the West, creating a whole new military district, and then focusing
on the trials of the Dakota and their pending executions were
distractions Lincoln did not need or want.
Lincoln also had strong political reasons for supporting the
executions. Just as the trials of the Dakota were winding down,
Lincoln and his party had been badly bruised in the 1862 midterm
elections, losing twenty-two House seats, and holding control of the
House of Representatives only with the help of a block of war
Democrats who called themselves Unionists. The Republicans lost
control of state legislatures in Illinois and Indiana and the New
York governorship. This backlash was caused by war weariness and
the general weakness of the Union war effort in the East.
Opposition to Lincoln’s plans for emancipation, announced in late
September, hurt the Republicans in some places, especially in the
lower Midwest and among Irish immigrants in New York City.
Under these circumstances Lincoln could hardly afford to risk
alienating voters in Minnesota, who at this time were
overwhelmingly Republican. In Minnesota, there was enormous
popular support for executing all of the convicted Indians. In the
calculus of good and evil, suffering and redemption, Lincoln might
have easily concluded that the lives of a few hundred Indians—all
of whom appeared to have made war on settlers—was a small cost
to shore up support for saving the nation and reshaping the
ongoing national conflict into a war for freedom and
emancipation.
Yet, despite these obvious reasons for simply allowing the
executions to go forward, Lincoln did not do so. Instead, he and
his staff reviewed all the convictions. In the process he concluded
that many of the charges against the Dakota were exaggerated or
bogus. As one historian has noted, “[e]arly accounts of the
uprising seized upon the occasional instances of torture and
mutilation, exaggerated them, and conjured up a picture of
27
wholesale atrocities unparalleled in the history of Indian warfare.”
A letter from Minnesota Senator Morton S. Wilkinson and the
state’s two Congressmen detailed “fiendish brutality,” murders in
28
“cold blood,” and gang rapes. All three were Republicans and
Wilkinson was an ally of Lincoln. This somewhat hysterical letter
27. ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN
POLICY ON TRIAL 120 (1967).
28. Letter from M. S. Wilkinson, Cyrus Aldrich, and Wm. Windom to
Abraham Lincoln, in Message of the President, supra note 7, at 2–4.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss2/2

8

Finkelman: I Could not Afford to Hang Men for Votes—Lincoln the Lawyer, Huma

2013]

LINCOLN THE LAWYER

413

was full of allegations that Lincoln politely described as “statements
29
of fact not found in the records of the trials.” Indeed, as the
historian Roy Meyer notes, “Like Falstaff’s story of the men he
battled . . . the closer these stories are scrutinized, the less
30
foundation there seems to be for them.” Similarly, General Pope
had told Lincoln, although he knew better, that all of the men
sentenced to death had murdered civilians and ravished women
31
and girls “in more or less degree.” After his examination of the
record, Lincoln discovered that the persistent assertions
throughout the conflict and its aftermath of rapes and the
slaughtering of women, children, and captives were vastly
overstated and mostly false. Lincoln concluded that only two of the
32
condemned men had actually raped anyone, although a number
of other convicted men had killed civilians, including women and
children. In the end, Lincoln refused to authorize the executions
of 265 of the 303 men sentenced to die, effectively pardoning
them.
On December 26, 1862, the army hanged thirty-eight Dakota
33
men.
Some of those executed had in fact killed civilians
needlessly, murdered captured prisoners, defiled dead bodies, and
34
raped captured women and girls. Under the rules of war at the
time, the men who committed these acts were legitimately executed
for what today we would call “war crimes.”
However, the
overwhelming majority of those sentenced to death, and many of
those actually executed, were almost certainly innocent of such
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 1.
MEYER, supra note 27, at 120.
Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788.
32. Message of the President, supra note 7, at 1. Other Dakota may have been
involved in rapes and other barbarities, but they were either killed in battle or
escaped north with Little Crow and were not captured and tried at this time. See
DUANE SCHULTZ, OVER THE EARTH I COME: THE GREAT SIOUX UPRISING OF 1862, at
245, 249 (1992).
33. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 27, 1862), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 880 (“I
have the honor to inform you that the 38 Indians and half-breeds ordered by you
for execution where hung yesterday at Mankato, at 10 a.m. Everything went off
quietly, and the other prisoners are well secured.”).
34. At least one of those executed, a man named Chaskay, was clearly
innocent, and in fact had saved the lives of whites. MEYER, supra note 27, at 130.
Lincoln reprieved him at the last minute, but another man with a similar name,
was reprieved instead. Id. This tragedy illustrates the arbitrary nature of the trials,
the absurd rush to judgment by the military, the failure of the military to assess
individual guilt, and the generally slipshod nature of the records of the trials.
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offenses. Despite the war crimes committed by some of those
executed, the whole episode is rightly condemned as a barbaric
blot on the nation. It is remembered as the largest mass execution
in American history.
Given racial sensibilities in the nineteenth century and cultural
hostility to Indians, we should probably not be surprised by the
attempt to perpetrate this needless slaughter of people who were
already incarcerated.
The 303 death sentences were more
vengeance than justice. The military and political leaders in
Minnesota, as well as a majority of whites in the state, might very
well have agreed with this analysis, but would have said that this
vengeance was justified. As one “humble private citizen” wrote to
Lincoln, “Not only does justice require the blood of these savages,
but vengeance will have it,” and if the Indians were not hanged,
35
“[e]very man will become an Avenger.”
Thus, the more
interesting question is not why so many men were sentenced to die,
or even why so many were executed, but why so many—seven times
as many—were not executed. While we remember this as the
largest mass execution in American history, it is worth considering
why this was also the largest mass pardoning of condemned
prisoners in American history. What was it about President Lincoln
that led him to effectively pardon eighty-seven percent of those
who were sentenced to die?
II. WHAT WE CALL THE CONFLICT, AND WHY THAT MATTERS
Any discussion of the conflict in Minnesota in August and
September 1862 is complicated by language, perception, and
cultural values. Indeed, even what we call the conflict is contested.
When the conflict began, the politicians and military leadership in
Minnesota called it a war. But when the conflict was over it became
known as the Great Sioux Uprising. More recently it was called the
Dakota War, taking the emphasis off the conflict as an uprising.
Most scholars and public institutions now call it the U.S.-Dakota
36
War, implying that it was a war between two sovereignties. How
35. Letter from Thaddeus Williams to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 22, 1862), in
THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13 (emphasis added). Williams was a
physician in St. Paul. His hysterical letter described numerous atrocities against
settlers, including the beheading of prisoners, people nailed to trees,
disemboweling of people, and other horrors which in fact had not taken place.
36. For example, the exhibit at the Minnesota History Center
commemorating the sesquicentennial of the conflict calls it the U.S.-Dakota War.
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we categorize the conflict affects how we see the events that
followed its conclusion. If it was an “uprising” then the Indian
combatants were not “soldiers,” but more like hooligans or
criminals, an unruly—but well-armed—mob randomly causing
violence and death. An uprising is essentially a criminal act,
perpetrated by malcontents who know they are acting illegally.
Thus, those in an uprising might be subject to trial and
punishment. On the other hand, if it was a “war” between two
sovereign nations, as Carol Chomsky argues, then the captured
Dakota soldiers should have been “treated as legitimate
37
belligerents.” Once defeated they were prisoners of war and not
subject to criminal prosecution, unless they had actually committed
war crimes.
None of these terms fully or adequately describe the events of
that fall, however. The vast majority of the Dakota in Minnesota
did not take part in the conflict. “The Sioux were at no time
united, at no time committed as a nation to the purposes of the
38
hostile minority.”
Indeed, most of the Dakota in Minnesota
opposed the resort to violence on ethical grounds and for practical
39
reasons. The war, if that is what it was, cannot be seen as a war
40
between two sovereignties, because the Dakota Nation did not
authorize the war and most leaders of the Dakota opposed it. Many
Dakota had converted to Christianity, adopted western dress and
customs, become farmers, and were therefore unwilling to return
to their past lives. In addition, most Dakota understood that a war
with the United States was essentially suicidal. Thus, designations
such as the “Sioux Uprising,” the “Dakota War,” or the “U.S-Dakota
War” imply much greater support among the Dakota than there
41
actually was.
Commemorating the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://legacy.mnhs
.org/featured-projects/commemorating-us-dakota-war-1862 (last visited Nov. 24,
2012).
37. Chomsky, supra note 3, at 15.
38. MEYER, supra note 27, at 118.
39. See id. Most of the fighting was done by members of the lower Sioux, but
“most of the principle chiefs of both the lower and upper Sioux, such as Wabasha,
Wacouta, Traveling Hail (who had won the election for speaker), Red Iron, and
Standing Buffalo, were opposed to the uprising and either took no part or joined
very reluctantly in a few battles, meanwhile giving all the aid they safely could to
white victims.” Id.
40. Contra Chomsky, supra note 3, at 74–76 (arguing otherwise).
41. An analogous naming issue can be seen in the “Red Stick War” of 1811,
between the “Red Stick” Creeks and the United States. In that war the Lower
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It is also not clear whether the Dakota in Minnesota, in 1862,
were a sovereign nation, at least under American law. By 1862, the
Dakota had ceded almost all their land in Minnesota to the U.S.
42
government and lived on a tiny sliver of what had once been their
vast territory. In return for this land the Dakota had accepted
annual payments—annuities—from which they purchased most of
their food and other necessities. As such they were almost entirely
dependent on the U.S. government for their survival through the
annuities. Indeed, the failure of the annuities to arrive was what
caused the outbreak of violence in the first place. While Indians
further west who had not signed treaties, and had not given up
almost all of their economic independence, might be considered
“legitimate belligerents in wartime,” to use Professor Chomsky’s
43
phrase, it is not entirely clear this theory would apply to the
Dakota in Minnesota who had in fact ceded almost all aspects of
their sovereignty to the United States. To use Chief Justice John
44
Marshall’s terminology from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, we might
argue that the Dakota in Minnesota had been reduced to
45
something far less than even “domestic dependent nations.” But,
46
even if this is an incorrect analysis, the Dakota had not made war
on the United States. Only a small group of the Dakota had. After
the conflict was over the military would punish all the Dakota in
Minnesota, even those who had protected whites and did not join
in the conflict. This is rightly condemned as punishing the group
47
for actions of a small minority within the group. But, the logic of
this condemnation cuts in both directions. If it was wrong to
punish all the Dakota because of what a small group did—and it
was surely wrong on legal and moral grounds—then it is impossible
Creeks, as well as the Choctaw and Cherokee, were allied with the United States,
against a separatist group of Creek known as the “Red Sticks.” While earlier
historians called this the “Creek War,” it is more properly called the Red Stick War
or the Creek Civil War today, recognizing that the Creek were themselves deeply
divided in this conflict. For more information on the Red Stick War, see ROBERT
V. REMENI, ANDREW JACKSON AND HIS INDIAN WARS 62–77 (2001).
42. See Treaty with the Yankton Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743; Treaty with
the Sioux—Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949.
43. Chomsky, supra note 3, at 75.
44. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
45. Id. at 17.
46. As Professor Chomsky would argue in Chomsky, supra note 3, at 76–77.
47. Andrew Jackson had done the same thing to the entire Creek Nation,
after the Red Stick War, even though a majority of the Creek had opposed the Red
Stick, and many of the Creek had fought alongside Jackson against the Red Stick.
See REMENI, supra note 41, at 75–77.
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to argue that the Dakota who did fight represented a sovereign
nation going to war against the United States. It may be true that
the United States recognized the right of the Dakota Nation “to
48
make war.” But in Minnesota in 1862, the Dakota Nation did not
go to war with the United States. Only a small group of Dakota did.
Thus, both the terms “uprising” and “war” seem imprecise. An
uprising implies the illegitimacy of the participants. And it might
imply a relatively short time frame. An uprising seems to be
something like a riot, but larger and longer lasting. But the events
in Minnesota lasted about six weeks, and claimed as many as 1000
lives, or more. This was surely bigger than an uprising.
But, was it a “war”? There was no declaration of war or even an
agreement among the Dakota that they should commence
hostilities. The army talked about it as a war, but in reality, neither
Congress nor the President saw the conflict in Minnesota as a true
war. The events in Minnesota stood in marked contrast from the
ongoing Civil War. Neither side followed accepted rules of
behavior in a war. The Dakota mostly killed civilians, and fought
only a few engagements with the army. Similarly, as the conflict
came to an end, the army rounded up thousands of noncombatants, including those who did not support the violence, and
destroyed their crops and homes. There were three or four
skirmishes between the Dakota warriors and the U.S. Army, and
one decisive military engagement, the Battle of Wood Lake, on
September 23, when somewhere between 700 and 1200 Dakota
were forced to retreat from a force led by Colonel Henry H.
49
Sibley. While a few hundred soldiers may have died, most of the
whites killed were civilians including a significant number of
women and children. These do not seem to be the statistics or the
demographics of a traditional war. After the war—if that is what it
was—the army acted in violation of almost every acceptable
standard of behavior for the treatment of prisoners and civilians.
Indeed, leaders in Minnesota, including General John Pope,
General Henry Sibley, and Governor Alexander Ramsey, spoke of
exterminating the Dakota, and while not actually embarking on a
campaign of genocide, they hinted that this was their ultimate
50
goal. Dakota civilians who had nothing to do with the conflict
48. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 583 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring).
49. MEYER, supra note 27, at 115–23; KENNETH CARLEY, THE SIOUX UPRISING OF
1862, at 58–59 (1961).
50. See infra notes 90–108 and accompanying text.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2

418

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:2

were rounded up, their crops were burned, their housing
destroyed, and they were interned in camps that would be
precursors of how the British treated the Boers in South Africa a
51
half-century later. Much of the behavior of the army after the
conflict was over can only be described as racist vengeance,
perpetrated against innocent civilians who had taken no part in the
conflict, and some of whom had provided shelter for fleeing white
settlers. Meanwhile, in violation of the traditional rules of war,
combatants were put on trial and sentenced to death, on the theory
that they had not been involved in a legitimate war, but rather had
participated in some illegal violent activity.
If not an “uprising” or a “war,” perhaps it should be called a
revolution or a rebellion, since in a very classic sense, this was a
rebellion against the rule of the United States. Alternatively, it
might be more precise to call this Little Crow’s War, after the
Dakota chief who led the relatively small minority of the Dakota in
52
their brief war. Those Dakota who followed Little Crow may have
seen themselves as citizens of a sovereign nation fighting for their
independence and defending their very existence against callous
policies by agents of the U.S. government. They may have believed
their actions were justified by desperate circumstances.
Whatever the terminology, there is yet one more way to
analyze the events. The Dakota who fought against the army were
involved in warfare, even if they represented only a minority of the
53
Dakota Nation. As will be noted below, even if the technical rules
of international law and conventional declarations of war were not
present, the United States should have treated the Dakota soldiers
as legitimate belligerents, just as it was treating Confederate
soldiers, who fought an undeclared war for a putative nation that
no other country in the world recognized as legitimately a
sovereign state.

51. The British used the term “concentration camp” for the facilities used to
intern Afrikaans civilians during the Boer War. The camp at Pike Island, which
held about 1600 Dakota civilians, may in fact have been the world’s first
concentration camp. About 300 Dakota died in this camp from disease and
malnutrition. See Mark Joy, U.S. Dakota War of 1862, in 2 PAUL FINKELMAN & TIM
ALAN GARRISON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY AND LAW 804
(2009).
52. This would mirror the name of the war in Illinois in 1832–1833, known as
Black Hawk’s War.
53. See infra Part VII.
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III. WHAT CAUSED THE CONFLICT?
The Dakota who fought believed they had no choice, because
their very existence was threatened by white settlers, Indian agents
in Minnesota, and the policies of the National Government. The
initial cause was the delay in the annuity payments and the reality
that the Dakota were facing starvation. As the Dakota leader
Robert Hakewaste later recalled, “We were starving and in a
54
desperate state of mind.” There were many underlying causes,
including the corruption of the Indian agents and the often
dishonest practices of the Indian traders, who persistently appeared
to cheat the Indians out of much of their annuities. Beyond these
economic issues were cultural conflicts. The Dakota who fought—
mostly young men of the Mdewakanton band associated with Little
Crow—felt squeezed by settlers and government policies, and they
saw no future for themselves or their people. Dakota Chief Big
Eagle, who opposed the violence, recalled that “the whites were
always trying to make the Indians give up their life and live like
55
white men,” and this was something many Dakota had no interest
in doing. Big Eagle thought the demands for change were coming
too quickly and were accompanied by enormous white arrogance
56
and racism. These ongoing issues, combined with the imminent
starvation, delay in the annuity payments, and callousness on the
part of the Indian agents and traders, led to the violence.
57
58
Under the treaties of 1851 and 1858 the Dakota had ceded
most of southern Minnesota to the national government in
exchange for annual “annuity payments” for fifty years. The
Dakota were slowly transitioning to a farming culture and lacked
54. Evidence for Defendants, Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands v. United States,
39 Ct. Cl. 172 (1904) (No. 22524), reprinted in GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON & ALAN R.
WOOLWORTH, THROUGH DAKOTA EYES: NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE MINNESOTA
INDIAN WAR OF 1862 32 (1988). However, historian Gary Clayton Anderson argued
that in mid-August the Dakota began to harvest what was the most abundant crop
in memory and that by mid-August the Dakota had an abundance of food, and the
serious food shortage that existed just a few weeks before no longer existed. See
Gary Clayton Anderson, Myrick’s Insult: A Fresh Look at Myth and Reality, MINN. HIST.
MAG., Spring 1983, at 198, 200, available at http://collections.mnhs.org
/MNHistoryMagazine/articles/48/v48i05p198-206.pdf.
55. Jerome Big Eagle, A Sioux Story of War, reprinted in ANDERSON &
WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 23.
56. Id.
57. Treaty with the Sioux—Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, July 23, 1851, 10
Stat. 949.
58. Treaty with the Yancton Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743.
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59

enough land to survive by hunting and fishing. They depended
on the annuity payments for their very survival. But often they were
cheated out of some of their money by corrupt Indian agents and
Indian traders. In 1862, for instance, the Indian traders claimed
half of the annuity for payment of goods previously given to the
Dakota, even though some Dakota, such as Joseph Wabasha, had
60
never agreed to this transfer of funds.
Even though Wabasha
opposed violence, he, like many other Dakota, believed he had
been cheated out of his annuity by the Indian traders. He recalled
that, “the young men of the tribe . . . felt very angry” and “would
61
not submit to having half of their annuity taken from them.” The
conflict began in August 1862 at least in part because the annual
62
payments “were months late in arriving.” Rumors were rife that
they might never be paid because the federal government was
bankrupt or because the Confederates had so disrupted the
63
economy that there was no money to send.
There were also
rumors that rather than being paid in gold, the Dakota annuities
would be paid in newly printed greenbacks, which the Indian
64
traders reportedly might not accept. Gold coin had to be sent
from Washington, but the Civil War impacted all government
operations, including shipping gold west. The focus of the
administration was on the ongoing War of the Rebellion.
Transportation west was complicated by military requirements, and
of course gold itself was more scarce than usual. Thus, the
allotments were very late. But, the Dakota depended on these
allotments for their very survival, and by late August they were
65
desperately running out of food.
The Upper Indian Agency at Yellow Medicine, fearful of
violence from the Indians, and perhaps out of compassion for the
Indians who faced starvation, began to distribute food in advance
of the annuity payments. Officials at the Lower Agency at
Redwood, however, lacked such foresight or compassion and
59. Henig, supra note 22, at 107.
60. ANDERSON & WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 12–13.
61. Papers Relating to Talks and Councils Held with the Indians in Dakota and
Montana Territories in the Years 1866–1869, at 90–91 (1910), reprinted in ANDERSON &
WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 30.
62. ANDERSON & WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 13.
63. Henig, supra note 22, at 108.
64. MEYER, supra note 27, at 112–13; Chomsky, supra note 3, at 17.
65. Ironically, the gold for the annuities arrived in St. Paul on August 16 and
at Fort Ridgley on August 18, by which time the conflict had begun and a number
of white settlers were dead. See MEYER, supra note 27, at 113.
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refused to allow the Dakota to purchase food on credit, in advance
of the allotment, even though the Lower Agency had plenty of food
on hand to distribute to the Indians. Some traders did not trust
the Dakota to pay their debts, while others had absolutely no
sympathy for the desperation of the Dakota. This attitude was
famously expressed by an Indian trader named Andrew Myrick who
declared: “So far as I am concerned, if they are hungry, let them eat
66
grass.” Little Crow’s followers responded to this callousness with
violence.
Frustrated and hungry, on August 17, 1862, a few Dakota
attacked a white farmstead near Acton, in Meeker County, killing
Robinson Jones, his wife, his adopted daughter, and two other
67
white men. Within a day the Rebellion was in full force. Dakota
swept through isolated farms and small towns. By mid-September
large numbers of settlers—probably no fewer than 600 and perhaps
as many as 800 to 1000—had been killed, much of the town of New
Ulm had been destroyed, and as many as 20,000 settlers in western
68
Minnesota had fled to St. Paul.
These farmers, who were
innocent of hostile acts toward the Dakota, lost their crops, which
they had to abandon in the fields, and suffered enormous
hardships. More than a hundred other settlers, the majority of
them women and children were also captured by the Dakota. A few
were murdered after their capture, and some of the women may
have been raped. The Rebellion was effectively over on September
23, when the Minnesota militia and federal troops defeated the
Dakota at the Battle of Wood Lake. After the battle, hundreds of
66. DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE DAKOTA CONFLICT TRIALS, http://
law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/dakota/Dak_account.html (last visited
Nov. 24, 2012). Myrick would be killed on the first day of the conflict, and grass
was stuffed into his mouth. Curt Brown, In the Footsteps of Little Crow 150 Years After
the U.S.-Dakota War, STAR TRIB., Aug. 15, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 17306280.
This quotation is found in almost every account of the conflict. See ANDERSON &
WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 198 (providing a history of the story of Myrick’s
insult and suggesting that it may not have taken place, or that it was not one of the
precipitating events leading to the violence); see also “Let Them Eat Grass” Revisited,
A THRILLING NARRATIVE OF INDIAN CAPTIVITY: DISPATCHES FROM THE DAKOTA WAR OF
1862 (Aug. 17, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://athrillingnarrative.com/2012/08/17/let
-them-eat-grass-revisited/ (arguing that “Myrick is not the central character in this
story; he simply got the most quotable line.”).
67. MEYER, supra note 27, at 115.
68. For a description of the burning of much of New Ulm, see HANK H. COX,
LINCOLN AND THE SIOUX UPRISING OF 1862 103–04 (2005). For various descriptions
of the military conflict, see DAHLIN, supra note 3, at 1; MEYER, supra note 27, at 120;
SCHULTZ, supra note 32, at 249; Nichols, supra note 3, at 8.
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Dakota immediately surrendered and most of the rest were quickly
captured, although their leader, Little Crow, managed to escape
69
into Canada.
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE CONFLICT
The conflict began on August 18. Almost immediately,
Governor Alexander Ramsey appointed Henry Hastings Sibley to
organize a defense of the state. Sibley had been the first governor
of the state of Minnesota, and in 1862, and at the outbreak of
violence, was appointed a colonel in the state militia, making him
70
the highest ranking military officer in the state. On August 21,
Governor Ramsey telegraphed Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton,
71
asking for help while Minnesota’s Secretary of State asked
Assistant Secretary of War, Christopher P. Wolcott, for
authorization to raise a cavalry force of 1000 men and to purchase
72
a sufficient number of horses for them to ride into battle. Five
days later, Governor Ramsey begged Major General Henry W.
Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the army, to create a military
district in the Northwest as a prelude to sending sufficient troops
73
and leadership to fully crush the Indians in the region. Halleck
bluntly told the Governor that the “War Department is not
prepared at present to create a new military department in the
74
West.”
69. In July 1863, Little Crow would return to Minnesota with his son. While
foraging for food he was shot and killed by a local farmer, Nathan Lamson, who
received a $500 bounty for killing Little Crow and turning his scalp over to the
state. His son was captured and scheduled for execution, but this never
happened. Ultimately he was released from custody, perhaps reflecting that even
in Minnesota people lacked the stomach to execute a child for the “crimes” of his
father.
70. See Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Campaign of 1862: Sibley’s Letters to His Wife,
MINN. HIST. MAG., Sept. 1962, at 99, available at http://collections.mnhs.org
/MNHistoryMagazine/articles/38/v38i03p099-114.pdf. By the end of September,
Sibley had been promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteer within the regular
army. Id. at 109. Sibley would later be promoted to Brevet Major General and
command the Department of the Northwest. Id. at 114.
71. Telegram of Alexander Ramsey to E. M. Stanton (Aug. 21, 1862 at 4:00
PM), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at
590.
72. Telegram of J. H. Baker to Hon. C. P. Wolcott (Aug. 21, 1862), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 590–91.
73. Telegram of Alexander Ramsey to Henry Halleck (Aug. 26, 1862 at 2:00
PM), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at
597.
74. Telegram of H. W. Halleck to Alexander Ramsey (Aug. 29, 1862), in
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But Halleck missed the political significance of this issue,
which President Abraham Lincoln did not miss. Facing midterm
elections, Lincoln doubtlessly saw creating a military department in
Minnesota as both politically useful and perhaps necessary to
restore peace on the northwestern frontier. Governor Alexander
Ramsey asked Lincoln to order the War Department to supply
horses or mounted troops for the conflict, arguing that this “is not
75
our war, it is a National War.”
There is some evidence that
Lincoln and others in the administration initially may have agreed
with Ramsey, actually believing, or at least fearing, that the Indian
violence was the result of Confederate machinations, and thus a
stronger military presence in Minnesota might be truly necessary
for the safety of the nation. In his letter to Assistant Secretary of
War Wolcott, Minnesota’s Secretary of State said that the Dakota
76
violence was a result of a “deep-laid plan.” This was actually not
true, but the Lincoln administration feared it might be true, and
that Confederate agents were trying to start a wholesale Indian war
in the West. Secretary of Interior, Caleb B. Smith, later claimed to
have evidence that “southern emissaries” had conspired with the
77
Dakota. Thus, for both military and political reasons, Halleck was
forced to do a quick about-face, and on September 6, Secretary of
War Stanton ordered Major General John Pope to “proceed
immediately” to St. Paul, where he was to assume the position of
commander of the newly created Department of the Northwest and
“take such prompt and vigorous measures as shall quell the
hostilities and afford peace, security, and protection to the people
78
against Indian hostilities.”
The choice of Pope was curious, but perhaps predictable.
Pope was a West Point graduate who had had some initial success
in the West, defeating Sterling Price in Missouri and helping to
capture a key island in the Mississippi. He was then transferred to
the East where he suffered a humiliating defeat at the Second
Battle of Bull Run just days after outbreak of violence in Minnesota.
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 605.
75. Telegram from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Sept. 6, 1862),
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
76. Telegram of J. H. Baker to Hon. C. P. Wolcott (Aug. 21, 1862), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 590–91.
77. Nichols, supra note 3, at 5; see also LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1,
at 78.
78. Telegram of E. M. Stanton to John Pope (Sept. 6, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 617.
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His failure at Bull Run, combined with his almost insufferable
arrogance, made it impossible to put him in combat against the
Confederates. At the same time, Pope did have military and
logistical skills. The new department in the Northwest provided
General Halleck with a place to send Pope while enhancing
Lincoln’s support in the West. Pope initially saw his removal to the
Northwest as a demotion (which after Bull Run he should have
expected), but quickly used the new post to lead an aggressive
campaign against the Dakota that he doubtlessly hoped would lead
to a new command in the real war against the Confederates.
Pope and Sibley quickly organized a defense of the state, and
within a few weeks the Dakota had been defeated. The conflict was
essentially over after the Battle of Wood Lake, on September 23.
Hundreds of Dakota soon surrendered to the army, and those who
had not participated in the conflict came forward with whites they
had sheltered or rescued from other Dakota who had captured
them. Sibley continued to pursue some Dakota into early October,
79
rounding up Indians who had not been involved in the conflict.
Indeed, the Indian population of Minnesota suffered worse after
peace was restored than during the conflict. On October 9,
General Pope sent a dispatch to General Halleck stating that “[t]he
80
Sioux war may be considered at an end.”
V. THE TRIALS
Following the restoration of peace, the army tried 393 Indians
81
for the “crime” of going to war with the United States.
On
October 3, Colonel Sibley, who by then was actually a brigadier
82
general, reported that a military tribunal was already at work
79. Telegram of John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 4, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 709 (noting that
Sibley was still pursuing Indians and that he wanted to disarm the Winnebagoes,
which Pope and Sibley asserted (incorrectly in fact) had been “engaged in the
recent outrages with the Sioux”); see also Telegram of Henry H. Sibley to John
Pope (Oct. 5, 1862), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES,
supra note 8, at 711–12 (describing his attempts to capture all remaining Sioux,
disarm them, and arrest “the men, except the older ones”).
80. Telegram of John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 9, 1862 at 10:45 PM), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 722.
81. See Chomsky, supra note 3; Herbert, supra note 4.
82. Sibley did not find out about this promotion until October 7. See
Telegram of Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 717. Technically he was
Brevet Brigadier General until April 7, 1864, when Congress confirmed this
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“engaged in the trial of between 20 and 30 of the Indians . . .
suspected of participating in the murders and outrages committed
83
on the frontier.”
Sibley admitted that ninety percent of those
Indians in his custody “have not been actively engaged in the war,”
84
but he had to ferret out those who had. Sibley already assumed
he would execute those found guilty, but would not order any
executions until he could persuade all the Indians not in his
custody to surrender. He understood that if they heard about
85
death sentences “they might be deterred from returning.”
General Pope agreed with this analysis, telling General Halleck “it
will be necessary to try and execute many of those engaged in the
86
late horrible outrages, and also some of the Winnebagoes.”
These trials were swift and summary. The Dakota were not
provided with counsel, as would have been done in a true court
87
martial, and most of the trials were shams. Without counsel the
defendants lacked any due process protections, since none of the
Dakota had any experience with American legal procedure. Some
of those prosecuted knew little or no English, but this did not deter
the military from trying them without defense counsel. But even
those who were fluent in English probably did not understand the
88
proceedings or that they were even on trial for their lives. None
of the defendants seemed to have had any idea of the legal right
against self-incrimination. Indeed, many probably believed that
honest answers would lead to fair treatment. This would have
comported with Native American notions of justice and with the
understanding of Indian soldiers operating in a traditional honor
culture. Thus, many of the defendants admitted to something,
such as firing a weapon, for example, or riding with Little Crow,
the leader of the rebellion. However, they were not always given
the opportunity to explain what they did—in effect to testify on
89
their own behalf and explain their circumstances.

promotion. Carley, supra note 70, at 109.
83. Telegram of Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 707.
84. Id. at 708.
85. Id.
86. Telegram of John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 7, 1862 at 1:30 PM), in
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 716.
87. For discussions of the trials, see generally Chomsky, supra note 3 and
Herbert, supra note 4.
88. Chomsky, supra note 3, at 52–53.
89. See LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 100.
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These admissions were used to convict many defendants.
Generals Pope and Sibley both believed that any participation in
the rebellion was enough to merit a conviction. This logic flew in
the face of General Pope’s own assertions to Lincoln after the trials:
“[T]hat the only distinction between the culprits is as to which of
them murdered most people or violated most young girls. All of
90
them are guilty of these things in more or less degree.” In fact,
Pope knew better. But it did not matter because the military
tribunal essentially held that any participation in the rebellion was
an offense and that there was no meaningful distinction between
those who committed what might be regarded as war crimes and
those who were merely soldiers or fellow travelers in Little Crow’s
make-shift army.
In the next six weeks the army tried 393 men, convicting 323
and sentencing 303 to death. Many of these hearings—it would be
too much to call them trials—lasted no more than five or ten
91
minutes. On the first day alone, sixteen men were tried with ten
92
being convicted and sentenced to death. On November 3, forty93
two men were tried, and on November 5, the last day of the
94
proceedings, forty men were tried. Assuming an eight-hour day,
with no pauses between hearings or recesses, this meant that each
trial lasted an average of twelve minutes or less. The standard of
guilt was quite simple: anyone who fired a rifle in any form of
95
combat was considered guilty and subject to a death penalty.
Sibley’s motivations are not clear. Some scholars suggest that
96
the trials were mostly an act of vengeance by a victorious army.
Surely there is an element of that. The soldiers under Sibley had
just fought for a month, many of their comrades were dead or
wounded, and revenge is a common human emotion. This level of
vengeance was also present in the civilian community in Minnesota,
as refugee settlers streamed into St. Paul and it became apparent
that hundreds of white settlers had been killed. The civilian

90. Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788.
91. LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 99–101; Chomsky, supra note 3,
at 25.
92. Chomsky, supra note 3, at 25.
93. Id. at 27.
94. MEYER, supra note 27, at 127.
95. See LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 100–01 (describing the
trials); see also Chomsky, supra note 3; Herbert, supra note 4.
96. See LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 125–26.
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community was also inundated with stories (mostly untrue) of
“outrages” committed against settler women and girls. All of this
was enough to lead to calls for vengeance and executions.
But these procedures also dovetailed with Sibley’s larger goal
of removing or killing all the Dakota in Minnesota. At the very
beginning of the conflict he told his wife, “My preparations are
nearly completed to begin my work upon them with fire and sword,
and my heart is hardened against them beyond any touch of
97
mercy.” He referred to them as “fiends” and “devils in human
98
shape.” On September 10, he vowed to “pursue” the “red devils”
99
As the conflict was coming to an end,
with “fire and sword.”
Sibley urged that he be replaced by a “strictly military commander”
who “would be better fitted” to “follow up the Indians vigorously
100
and exterminate them . . . .” If Sibley’s goal was extermination of
the Dakota, for whatever reason, the trials were a step in the right
direction. Executing a large number of young men would clearly
undermine and weaken the entire Dakota society.
The trials and executions also fit with the views of the highest
military leader in the state, Major General John H. Pope. Shortly
before the hostilities came to an end, Pope predicted that he had
the fire power to “put a final stop to Indian troubles by
exterminating or ruining all the Indians engaged in the late
101
outbreak.”
After the decisive battle at Wood Lake, Pope told
102
Sibley that “[n]o treaty must be made with the Sioux . . . .”
Instead, he was determined to “utterly . . . exterminate the Sioux if
I have the power to do so and even if it requires a campaign lasting
103
the whole of next year.”
Calling the Sioux “wild beasts,” he
asserted they deserved “punishment beyond human power to
inflict,” and urged Sibley to “[d]estroy everything belonging to
104
them . . . .”
While the trials were going on, Pope wrote the
Secretary of War indicating that he was “anxious to execute a

97.
98.
99.
100.

Carley, supra note 70, at 99, 101.
Id.
Id. at 106.
Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 680.
101. Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 17, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 649.
102. Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 28, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 686.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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105

number of them.” Pope had destroyed the crops of not only the
offending Dakota, but of other Dakota who had not been involved
in the combat and also the Winnebagoes, who had nothing to do
106
with the conflict.
Sibley, who had been one of the first white
settlers in Minnesota and had served as the first governor of the
107
state, was even more enthusiastic, expressing the hope at the very
beginning of the conflict that his forces would “overtake and kill a
thousand or more of the savages . . . and drive the remainder across
108
the Missouri or to the devil.”
When faced with the reality of the post-conflict trials, Sibley
vacillated between wanting swift punishment and mild concerns
about fairness. With over 250 prisoners in his care he admitted
that “[s]ome of them are probably innocent,” but believed “by far
109
This
the greater part will be found guilty of murder, rape, etc.”
was a significant change from his earlier belief that the vast majority
of the captured Indians were innocent of any crime. At this point
he was planning to send most of these captured men to Fort
Snelling and regretted that he would “be deprived of the
110
gratification of strangling the guilty ones.” Two days later he told
his wife that “the Indian prisoners are being tried as fast as a due
regard for justice will permit. I have to review all the proceedings

105. 1 GIDEON WELLES, DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON 171 (1911), available at http://archive.org/stream
/diarygideonwell09wellgoog#page/n230/mode/2up [hereinafter WELLES DIARY].
106. Id.
107. In the late 1830s and early 1840s Sibley had been virtually, although not
legally, married to an Indian woman, Red Blanket Woman, and fathered a child
with her, Helen Hastings Sibley. Jane Lamm Carroll, Who Was Jane Lamont?: AngloDakota Daughters in Early Minnesota, MINN. HIST. MAG., Spring 2005, at 192, available
at http://collections.mnhs.org/MNHistoryMagazine/articles/59/v59i05p184-196
.pdf. This relationship, known as a marriage “a la facon du pays,” lasted two or
three years, and Sibley never denied his paternity of Helen, paid for her
education, helped support her, and gave her away at her wedding in 1859. Id. at
192–93. Sibley later married Sarah Jane Steele, the daughter of a commanding
general at Fort Snelling. Sarah Sibley apparently hated that her husband
maintained a relationship with his half-Dakota daughter. Id. at 193. It is difficult
to know how this earlier relationship affected his views of Indians. It is possible
that given his earlier relationship with the Dakota, Sibley felt he had to go to extra
lengths to prove his bona fide hostility to the Dakota after the rebellion began.
108. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), in EXTRACTS
FROM GENERAL SIBLEY’S LETTERS TO HIS WIFE, WRITTEN ON THE INDIAN CAMPAIGN
(R.J. Holcombe ed., 1893), in Herbert, supra note 4, at 753.
109. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 13, 1862), in Carley,
supra note 70, at 110.
110. Id.
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111

and decide the fate of each individual.”
As a young man Sibley
had read law under the tutelage of his father, Solomon Sibley, the
first Chief Justice of the Michigan Territory. Henry Sibley was the
112
first Justice of the Peace in the Minnesota Territory.
But, for all
this legal background, Sibley clearly had no real sense of due
process or fair trials, as he reviewed trials that lasted a few minutes
and sentenced men to death for non-capital offenses on the basis of
virtually no evidence. His earlier legal training and his practice
113
experience served him poorly in 1862 and again afterwards when
114
At the beginning of the trials he
he tried to justify his actions.
did not bother to review the findings of his commission, telling
General Pope that “the proceedings . . . may not be exactly in form
in all the details,” but he fully expected to approve all the sentences
115
and “hang the villains.”
Pope would have agreed. He had
already told Sibley that he doubted it was possible to assess
individual guilt and “discriminate between Indians who say they are
116
and have been friendly, and those who have not.”
Sibley admitted to his wife that the “power of life and death is
an awful thing to exercise,” telling her “it makes me shudder” to
“think [that] more than three hundred human beings are subject
117
to that power.”
But, shudder or not, he was prepared to do his
“duty” and make sure that “judgment [would be] visited upon the
118
By the time the trials were over, Sibley had long
guilty.”
abandoned any notion of due process. “A military commission,” he
told Bishop Henry Whipple, “is not expected to enter into details
of a technical character,” and was not designed to function like
“ordinary criminal tribunals” or even like “regular courts111. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Carley,
supra note 70, at 110–11.
112. See Robert J. Sheran & Timothy J. Baland, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in
the Frontier Days of Minnesota: An Informal Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865, 2
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 6 n.33 (1976).
113. See Chomsky, supra note 3, at 93 (arguing that Sibley’s legal training led
him to use military commissions to provide a semblance of due process).
114. See Herbert, supra note 4, at 794–97 (describing Sibley’s post-execution
justifications and his desire to bring new hearings, and have new executions in
March 1863).
115. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 717.
116. Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Oct. 2, 1862), in Herbert,
supra note 4, at 774.
117. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Carley,
supra note 70, at 111.
118. Id.
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119

martial.” This was certainly how Sibley set them into motion, with
Pope’s acquiescence. But this was not in fact how they were
supposed to operate. In Missouri, the scene of the most violent
guerilla warfare in the Civil War, the army declared that military
commissions “should be . . . constituted in a similar manner and
their proceedings be conducted according to the same general
rules as courts-martial in order to prevent abuses that might
120
otherwise arise.” Congress applied this logic to the entire nation
121
in The Militia Act of 1862 by providing for the “same postconviction review in both military commissions and courts122
martial.”
Other scholars suggest that Sibley and Pope used the trials to
“protect” the incarcerated Dakota from lynching by the local
123
populace.
Pope and Sibley made this argument, claiming that
without the summary trials mobs of civilians would have massacred
many Dakota women, children, and old men in Sibley’s custody. By
this time, there were more than 1000 Indians under military
control. Trying and executing a sufficient number of combatants
might have been enough to satisfy the blood lust of most
Minnesotans, as articulated by one newspaper’s demand that the
124
Indians should be “exterminated.”
Sibley and Pope may have
believed this was what they were doing, but their arguments were
surely self-serving. The Indian non-combatants were in custody
only because Sibley had been so busy rounding them up and
forcing them off their lands. Moreover, the military was surely
powerful enough to protect the Dakota in custody if Sibley and
Pope wanted this to occur. That Sibley and Pope made these
arguments illustrates their own vacillation over the fate of the
Dakota.
Both Sibley and Pope had been calling for the
extermination, annihilation, or total removal of the Dakota. Yet,
when faced with the reality of the slaughter of women, children,
and old men, they stepped back.

119. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Henry B. Whipple (Dec. 4, 1862), in
Herbert, supra note 4, at 771.
120. Gen. Orders No. 1, Headquarters Dept. of the Missouri (Jan. 1, 1862) in
1 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 248.
121. Militia Act of 1862, Ch. CCI, sec. 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598.
122. Louis Fisher, Military Commissions: Problems of Authority and Practice, 24
B.U. INT’L L.J. 15, 27 n.97 (2006).
123. See, e.g., Chomsky, supra note 3, at 93–94.
124. SCHULTZ, supra note 32, at 243. For other examples of popular demands
for “extermination” of the Dakota see MEYER, supra note 27, at 124.
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Sibley complained that the newspapers thought he was too
“tender hearted” and that the trials and executions were not
125
moving fast enough. He insisted he would not “murder any man,
even a savage, who is shown to be innocent of the ‘great
transgression,’ or permit of the massacre of women and
126
children.”
But in fact he was pushing the trials along as fast as
possible and showed little concern for due process, fairness, or
actual guilt. Sibley may have been annoyed at pressure from
newspapers or the civilian public, and he may have formally
opposed killing native women and children, but he was still
planning further military expeditions to force these women and
children to leave Minnesota, and he had little regard for any fair
investigation of the alleged “crimes” of their husbands, fathers,
sons, and brothers, who he was planning to execute as quickly as
possible.
General Pope told Lincoln that vigilantes were preparing to
127
massacre the Dakota. Governor Ramsey similarly warned Lincoln
that “[n]othing but the Speedy execution of the tried and
convicted Sioux Indians will save us here from Scenes of
128
outrage.”
Civilians did make two attempts to attack Indian
prisoners in November, but the army easily prevented any
significant violence, capturing some of the civilian attackers and
129
forcing them to march with Indians to Mankato.
The fears of
Pope and Ramsey were clearly exaggerated and Lincoln probably
realized that they could not be taken at face value. He must have
intuitively understood that both Pope and Ramsey were trying to
force him to let the executions go forward. Clearly, the military
had more than sufficient force to protect all Indian captives from
vigilantes, and Pope, as a career officer, had the skill and backbone
to make sure his soldiers did their duty.
Another reason for the trials, demands for mass executions,
and the incarceration of even friendly and cooperative Indians,
125. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 20, 1862), in Carley,
supra note 70, at 111.
126. Id.
127. Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 24, 1862), quoted in
Nichols, supra note 3, at 10 n.34.
128. Telegram from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 28, 1862),
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/malquery.html (search for
“November 28, 1862, Ramsey”; then follow “Alexander Ramsey to Abraham
Lincoln, Friday, November 28, 1862” hyperlink).
129. Attacks by civilians on the Indian prisoners are described in Carley, supra
note 70, at 112–13; see also LINDER, supra note 66.
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involved land and money. Final removal of the Indians would open
130
more land to settlers and remove any fear of future violence.
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles believed that the vengeance
against the Dakota was part of a larger plan to remove other
Indians from the state. This was especially the case when it came to
the arrest of non-Dakota. He noted that “the Winnebagoes have
131
good land which white men want and mean to have.”
In reality there was no need for the trials. In addition, their
speed and lack of any semblance of due process were obviously
unnecessary. Once the Dakota had surrendered and were under
military control, they certainly posed no threat to the people of
Minnesota. The conflict was over, and there was no chance it could
resume, given the army’s decisive victory and the overwhelming
military force General Pope had in Minnesota. The threats from
civilian vigilantes, while real, were certainly exaggerated. The U.S.
Army could surely have protected the Indians from a mob of angry
farmers, and in fact, it did so. Governor Ramsey’s fear of “[s]cenes
of outrage” were either an admission of his utter incompetence as a
chief executive (which seems unlikely) or an exaggeration of the
threats in order to pressure Lincoln to allow the executions to take
place as quickly as possible. Ramsey was surely using the threats of
violence to accomplish his real goal, which was to go forward with
what would have been highly popular executions. Indeed, after
civilians attacked Indians under army guard, and were repulsed,
Ramsey issued a public proclamation “to avert the disastrous
consequences of a collision” between the people of Minnesota and
132
the United States. He urged all citizens to refrain from attacking
133
U.S. troops or Indians in the custody of the troops, and there
were no more outbreaks of such vigilante violence.
The terminology for the events comes directly into play when
we consider the motivations for the trials. Throughout the military
campaigns against the Dakota, both Pope and Sibley referred to the
“war” with the Dakota. Pope was a military man at war with the
enemy. As such, he and Sibley should have known that trying
130. MEYER, supra note 27, at 124–25.
131. See WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 171.
132. Alexander Ramsey, Proclamation to the People of Minnesota (Dec. 6, 1862),
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem /malquery.html (search for “Alexander Ramsey
to Minnesota Citizens”; then follow “Alexander Ramsey to Minnesota Citizens,
Saturday, December 6, 1862” hyperlink).
133. Id.
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prisoners—except for very specific crimes—was not acceptable
behavior. It was not a “crime” to go to war against an enemy. Many
Dakota were convicted of shooting at U.S. soldiers. This was surely
not a crime.
While Pope and Sibley did not understand their own
hypocrisy, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles did. As Lincoln
contemplated what to do with the convicted Dakota, he had to
cope with letters from Pope and Sibley, editorials, and the demands
of the Minnesota congressional delegation that the sentences be
swiftly carried out against all the convicted Indians. Secretary
Welles was especially annoyed by the behavior of Senator Morton S.
Wilkinson and the state’s two Congressmen. He wondered how
these “Representatives of a State can deliberately besiege the
Government to take the lives of these ignorant barbarians by
134
wholesale, after they have surrendered themselves prisoners.” He
thought the aggressive and almost bloodthirsty “sentiments of the
Representatives were but slightly removed from the barbarians
135
whom they would execute.”
The point was clear to Welles if the
Indians were soldiers who had surrendered, they could not then be
executed for having been soldiers. It was a position President
Lincoln would accept as well.
VI. THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE DAKOTA TRIALS
When President Lincoln received General Pope’s list of
condemned men, he immediately asked for the full records of the
trials. Lincoln was a war-time president, and by the end of 1862 he
was no longer shocked by the human cost of warfare. But, he was
also deeply troubled by unnecessary killing. Throughout his
presidency, he often commuted sentences of soldiers charged with
desertion or other infractions. He understood that warfare cost
lives, but he was also always reluctant to be the instrument of death
for people in federal custody. He reviewed about 1600 court
martial cases and, much to the annoyance of his generals, issued
pardons or commutations to almost all the enlisted men charged
136
with desertion or most other military offences. He also issued at
137
least 331 clemency orders for civilians convicted in federal courts.
134. See WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 186.
135. Id.
136. Pardons & Clemency, MR. LINCOLN’S WHITE HOUSE, http://
www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.org/inside.asp?ID=226&subjectID=3 (last visited Nov.
24, 2012). Lincoln did not generally commute sentences of soldiers charged with
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Many of Lincoln’s military and civilian pardons were clearly
138
His humane attitude towards
part of his own military strategy.
the troops certainly increased morale. For example, Lincoln never
signed a warrant for the execution of a common soldier convicted
139
of falling asleep while on guard duty.
In 1864, he issued a
wholesale pardon for “all deserters, who have been condemned by
140
Court Martial to death.” He later issued a wholesale pardon to all
deserters who were not in custody if they would return to their
141
units within two months of his proclamation.
Lincoln almost
always asked himself the pertinent question whenever a military
execution came up: “[W]hether this soldier can better serve the
142
country dead than living.” While Lincoln almost never signed an
execution warrant for soldiers charged with military infractions like
desertion or sleeping on duty, and regularly pardoned deserters, he
rarely commuted sentences for non-military crimes, such as murder
143
or rape.
Lincoln famously issued pardons when lobbied by
members of Congress, state politicians, and other “respectable” and
“honorable” citizens. He was equally susceptible to the entreaties
of mothers, wives, and sisters seeking to save a son, husband, or
144
brother.
Attorney General Bates complained he was “unfit to be
145
trusted with the pardoning power.” However, it is also clear that
Lincoln signed death warrants “only after he had examined the
facts of each case and determined that the sentence was
146
appropriate.”
Given this record of issuing pardons, it is perhaps not
surprising that Lincoln wanted more information from General
Pope before he was willing to authorize the executions of 303 men.
Lincoln was troubled by a single execution. Three hundred and

murder, rape, or other serious non-military offenses. Id.
137. P. S. Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision
Making, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84, 84 (1999).
138. Id. at 84–85.
139. Id. at 85.
140. E. D. Townsend, Order Commuting Sentence of Deserters, Gen. Orders
No. 76 (Feb. 26, 1864), in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 208 (Roy
P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN].
141. Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Offering Pardon to Deserters (March
11, 1865), in COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 140, at 349–50.
142. Pardons & Clemency, supra note 136.
143. Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 137, at 85.
144. Id. at 88–90.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 85.
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three at one time must have boggled his mind. If he was worried
about blood on his hands from the shooting of a teenage deserter,
as he clearly was, he would surely have been concerned about the
blood of over 300 men.
But, these were captured enemies, not American soldiers who
failed to fully do their duty. They were accused of barbaric
treatment of civilians—Lincoln’s own constituents—and of course
they also killed a substantial number of American soldiers before
they were finally subdued. And they were Indians, not whites.
Lincoln’s relationship with Indians was complicated.
His
grandfather had been killed by Indians in Kentucky, and his only
military experience—in which he never saw combat—was in Black
147
Hawk’s War.
Lincoln knew blacks while he was a lawyer in
Illinois, and even had them as clients, but he had had very few
interactions with Indians. They were truly foreign to him.
Politically, there was little advantage to issuing pardons. The
Indians were not constituents. Lincoln could not score points with
voters or soldiers by issuing pardons. Indeed, he would offend
voters and soldiers in Minnesota and perhaps Wisconsin. Lincoln
had received political pressure from the army, the civilian
leadership in Minnesota, Senator Wilkinson, and the state’s
congressmen. Had Lincoln followed his own political instincts, or
done what was politically expedient, he would have approved all of
the executions and ordered General Pope to move swiftly to
eliminate the problem of the Indian prisoners.
On the other hand, if Lincoln followed his general view of
executions and military trials—which apparently he did—he would
have to examine every one of the trial records. The many military
pardons Lincoln had already issued had convinced him that
military trials were notoriously unfair and often without any
meaningful due process. As a trial lawyer, the President was
particularly sensitive to the unfairness of military trials. In addition,
Lincoln and members of his cabinet were skeptical of the reports of
many generals. Many generals constantly wanted more troops and
equipment, constantly overestimated Confederate troop strength,
and then did not perform in battle. General Pope, who had just
embarrassed the administration with his huge loss at the Second
Battle of Bull Run, had little credibility with the administration.
His reports of Indian atrocities in Minnesota did not impress
147.

Nichols, supra note 3, at 3.
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Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who believed the tales of
148
Indian “barbarities” were “greatly exaggerated.”
While Sibley, Pope, Ramsey, Wilkinson, and other politicians
and citizens in Minnesota pressed Lincoln to let the executions go
forward, Lincoln also heard from a few people on the other side of
the issue. There was a memorial from a group of Quakers in
149
Pennsylvania, but that was to be expected.
Most scholars who
write about the pardon process assert that Bishop Henry B.
Whipple, the head of the Episcopal Church in Minnesota,
150
convinced Lincoln to pardon most of the convicted Dakota.
How much influence Bishop Whipple had over Lincoln is
uncertain. Scholars cite Whipple’s autobiography, in which he
describes his meeting with Lincoln while he was in the East to
151
attend the Episcopal General Convention.
At the meeting with
Lincoln, Whipple discussed the corruption of the entire Indian
Agency system, explaining how Indian agents, Indian traders, and
others systematically cheated the Indians while lining their own
pockets. Whipple claims in this book that Lincoln was “deeply
moved” by their conversation, and that later Lincoln told someone
that Whipple “talked to me about the rascality of the Indian
152
business until I felt it in my boots.”
However, this meeting took
place in mid-September, before the conflict in Minnesota was over,
and of course, before any Dakota had been put on trial. Whipple
was in Washington at about the time of the battle of Antietam,
where he preached to the First Minnesota and met General George
153
B. McClellan.
148. WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 186.
149. See Senator Morton S. Wilkinson, Speech at the Cong. Globe, 37th Cong.,
13th Sess. (1862); see also Chomsky, supra note 3, at 30; Herbert, supra note 4, at
780.
150. Nichols, supra note 3, at 9.
151. HENRY B. WHIPPLE, LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF A LONG EPISCOPATE 136–37
(1899).
152. Id. at 137. Many historians quote this story, but there is no source for it
beyond Whipple’s recollection. Whipple wrote about this in 1899, thirty-seven
years after the events took place.
153. See Diary of Bishop Henry B. Whipple (1864) [hereinafter Whipple
Diary], in THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, 1859–1899, box 42 (on file with Minn. Hist. Soc’y).
The Abraham Lincoln papers at the Library of Congress contain an undated
calling card from Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, to Lincoln,
introducing Lincoln to Bishop Whipple. See THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra
note 13. Chase was active in the Episcopal Church and would have been a natural
contact for Whipple. The Library of Congress erroneously dates this calling card
as “December 1862.” This dating is incorrect since Whipple was in Minnesota at
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Because this meeting took place before the conflict was over
and of course before any Indians were being tried for crimes,
Whipple could not have lobbied Lincoln to pardon anyone. His
conversations probably touched on the cause of the conflict in
Minnesota. But they were mostly about general Indian policies and
the corruption of Indian agencies. This would have comported
with a long letter Whipple sent Lincoln in March 1862 about the
154
failures of Indian policies and the dishonesty of Indian agents. In
that letter he complained that Indian agents were “often men
without any fitness, sometimes a disgrace to a Christian nation;
155
whiskey-sellers, bar-room loungers, debauchers.”
When Whipple
met with Lincoln in September, with the conflict in Minnesota still
raging, he probably continued to denounce the entire system of
Indian agents. But, there is one oddity about this meeting with the
President: Whipple made no mention of meeting the President in
156
his personal diary, although he did record many of the people he
met, including General McClellan, noted churches he preached at,
and towns he visited. It seems incomprehensible that he would
have not noted this meeting in his diary. Thus, his discussion of
this meeting in his memoirs, published thirty-seven years later,
makes one wonder if the meeting took place. Moreover, in
Whipple’s memoirs he offers no source or explanation of how he
heard that Lincoln said Whipple had made Lincoln feel the
157
“rascality” of the Indian agencies in his “boots.”
Whipple’s
discussions of the corruption of the Indian agency system would
probably have affected Lincoln’s views of the causes of the violence
in Minnesota, but Whipple could not have been lobbying Lincoln
for leniency before any trials took place.
After the trials Whipple lobbied Lincoln from a distance, but
he was clearly ambivalent about what should happen to the
convicted Dakota warriors. He wrote to Senator Henry M. Rice on
November 12, asking him to deliver a letter to Lincoln on the
that time. The footnote to this document also erroneously claims Whipple talked
to Lincoln about the Dakota prisoners at this time, which would have been
impossible, since there were none yet, because the meeting would have taken
place in September, and not December.
154. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 6, 1862), in
WHIPPLE, supra note 151, at 510–14.
155. Id. at 511.
156. Whipple Diary, supra note 153.
157. The lack of any mention in his diary or in any other source corroborating
this meeting does not prove Bishop Whipple did not meet with the President, but
it does weaken the case for it.
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158

proposed executions.
He praised Rice as “the only public man
who has at all times recognized the wickedness of our Indian
159
system.”
He told Rice: “We cannot hang men by the
160
Whipple argued that the captured Indians were
hundreds.”
“prisoners of war” and it would violate “our own premises” to hang
161
them.
But it does not appear this letter was directly about the
executions and trials. On November 20, Senator Henry M. Rice
sent Lincoln a petition from eighteen Episcopal bishops and
162
another twenty or so other leaders of the church, asking for a
comprehensive reform of American Indian policy. The petition
began with a reference to the “recent Indian attack” but then
immediately went to a discussion of needed reforms in Indian
policies. Whatever Whipple and the other Bishops thought about
the executions, they wanted the tragedy to lead to significant
163
reforms. Senator Rice delivered the petition to Lincoln, met with
the President, and on November 27, reported back to Whipple that
the President would advocate reform of the Indian agency system
164
in his annual message to Congress.
However, Rice did not
indicate that he discussed the convictions of the Dakota soldiers
165
with the President.
A few days later Whipple reiterated his “demand” for “a
166
reform” of the entire Indian agency system.
But then Whipple
clarified his views on the trials and executions, which Rice had
apparently misunderstood from Whipple’s earlier statements,
167
objecting to “hang[ing] men by hundreds.”
Whipple flatly
declared that when it came to the convicted Dakota soldiers he did
158. There does not appear to be an actual copy of this letter in existence,
only the cover letter Whipple sent Rice. See Letter from Henry B. Whipple to
Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), in THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40,
letterbook 4.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Letter from Henry M. Rice to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 20, 1862), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
163. Letter from Protestant Episcopal Church to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 20,
1862), in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
164. Letter from Henry M. Rice to Henry B. Whipple (Nov. 27, 1862), in THE
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 3.
165. Id.
166. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 29, 1862), in THE
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 3.
167. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), in THE
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 4.
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168

not “desire to screen the guilty murderers.”
He objected to the
irregularities in the commission’s work and wanted someone to
169
“carefully scrutinize between the guilty & innocent.”
He feared
for the many innocent Dakota in federal custody because of the
170
public “cry to exterminate every one who had a red skin.” But “as
a law abiding man” he was prepared to “bow to the supremacy of all
171
decisions lawfully conducted.” His only concern was whether the
convicted Dakota had fair trials “such as to carefully scrutinize
172
between the guilty and the innocent.”
Thus, even the most
committed friend of the Indians in Minnesota was, in the end, not
troubled by executing some Dakota soldiers, even though he had
initially argued that the captured Indians were “prisoners of war”
173
and it would violate “our own premises” to hang them.
Whipple’s concerns were mostly about the Indian system, and
only tangentially about the condemned Dakota. On December 4,
Whipple wrote Lincoln directly, thanking him for supporting a
reform of the entire Indian system, which was “a stupendous piece
174
of wickedness.” Whipple enclosed a “history of the causes of the
late fearful massacre,” but he did not urge Lincoln to pardon the
175
Dakota.
The petition from Whipple and the other Episcopal bishops
surely had some impact on Lincoln’s thinking. By this time
Lincoln fully understood that the Indian agents and traders in
Minnesota had been outrageous in their greed and incompetence.
He also fully understood that many of those sentenced to die were
innocent of any “outrages.” Along this line, Lincoln received a
letter from Stephen R. Riggs, a missionary and the chaplain to
General Sibley’s command.
He noted that “among those

168. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 29, 1862), in THE
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 3.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), in THE
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 4.
174. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 4, 1862), in
THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 3. The actual letter to
Lincoln is found in Record Group 48: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the
Interior, Entry 649: Records of the Indian Division, 1828–1907, General Records,
1838–1907, Letters Received, 1849–1880, National Archives College Park, College
Park, Maryland.
175. Id.
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condemned there are various grades of guilt from the men who
butchered women and children to the men who simply followed
with a party for the purpose of taking away spoils from the homes
176
of settlers who fled.”
But Riggs also admitted that most of the
convicted men “were condemned on general principles, without
177
any specific charges proved.”
Riggs told Lincoln “there is room
178
Riggs then suggested some
for the exercise of your clemency.”
specific men who should be pardoned.
The petitions of Whipple and the other bishops, Senator
Rice’s conversations with Lincoln, and other communications
condemning the trials doubtlessly affected Lincoln’s thoughts on
the subject. He told Rice he would raise the issue of Indian reform
in his annual message to Congress (the nineteenth century
equivalent of the State of the Union Address), which led Bishop
179
Whipple to profusely praise and thank Lincoln.
But
communications on the other side, including lobbying by Governor
Ramsey, Senator Wilkinson, General Pope, and others in the state,
urging speedy execution of all the Dakota also must have weighed
180
on Lincoln’s mind.
Bishop Whipple argued for justice and
humanitarian concerns for the Dakota; Ramsey and others argued
for justice for the dead settlers and for the good of the Republican
Party in the state. Ultimately, however, the concerns of those in
Minnesota were only part of the process that led Lincoln to pardon
the overwhelming majority of the Dakota soldiers who were
sentenced to death.
VII. LIEBER, THE LAW OF WAR, AND THE DAKOTA
The Dakota trials and Lincoln’s effective pardon of the vast
majority of those sentenced to death must also be seen in the
context of the emerging law of war within the administration. On
April 24, 1863, the administration would promulgate Francis

176. Letter from Stephen R. Riggs to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 17, 1862), in
THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 4, 1862), in
THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153.
180. Letter from M. S. Wilkinson, Cyrus Aldrich, and Wm. Windom to
Abraham Lincoln, in Message of the President, supra note 7, at 2–4. Morton S.
Wilkinson was the U.S. Senator from Minnesota, while Aldrich and Windom were
the state’s two Congressmen. All three were Republicans.
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Lieber’s code of war, known as General Orders 100.
This code,
or even a draft of it, was not available to Lincoln in December 1862.
Lieber first suggested writing the code to Major General Henry
Halleck on November 13, 1862, and it was December before the
182
project began.
Lieber wrote quickly, but he did not have a draft
of the Code until February, and therefore had nothing to give the
President before the pardons were issued. However, Lieber
influenced Lincoln in other ways.
After the first Battle of Bull Run, on July 21, 1861, the
administration was uncertain what to do with captured Confederate
prisoners. If secession was illegal, as Lincoln contended, then the
Confederates were little more than brigands, or perhaps some form
of land-based pirates, making war on the general populace, and
might be sent to hard labor, imprisoned, or even summarily
executed. But, such a solution would only lead to retaliation by the
Confederacy against U.S. soldiers, and encourage barbaric behavior
on both sides. But, if the captured Confederates were treated as
soldiers in battle, Lincoln and Attorney General Edward Bates
worried this would be a de facto recognition of the Confederacy as
a legitimate nation.
On August 19, 1861, Lieber published an open letter to
consider the nature of Confederate prisoners. He noted that this
was an issue that called for “[c]onsiderations of law, authority,
183
humanity, [and] wise foresight.”
The issue concerned the
treatment of captured Confederates—whether they were soldiers or
pirates—and also how captured U.S. soldiers might be treated. In
arguing that traditional rules of war should be applied to prisoners,
he asserted that this was not a formal or diplomatic recognition of
184
the Confederacy but was merely “the recognition of reality.”
Lieber offered an analogy which set the issue out clearly: “When a
highway robber asks my purse, and I, being unarmed, consider it
expedient to give it, I certainly recognize the robber, it is no more
185
than recognition of a fact.” For humanitarian reasons it was also
181. Gen. Orders No. 100, reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S
CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45–71 (1983).
182. See Special Orders No. 399, War Dept., Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington D.C., Dec. 17, 1862, in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 951; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S
CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (2012).
183. Francis Lieber, The Disposal of Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1861, at 5.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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important that Confederate prisoners be treated as legitimate
186
This would not be
belligerents under international law.
recognition of the Confederacy and would not even prevent a
subsequent prosecution for treason if that was what the
government wanted to do. But it would be a practical solution to
the problem, since both sides had captured each other’s soldiers.
Eventually Lieber’s theory would lead to prisoner exchanges. In
this letter Lieber noted, but dismissed, the idea of executing
prisoners of war. This would in effect reduce the United States to
the level of the Jacobins during the French Revolution who
187
“guillotined . . . the prisoners they made.”
Lieber’s point was
clear: civilized, humane nations did not execute prisoners of war.
In a subsequent essay published in 1862, Lieber set out rules
188
for dealing with guerrilla soldiers and other irregular forces.
Here he argued that “guerrillamen, when captured in fair fight and
open warfare, should be treated as the regular partisan is, until
special crimes, such as murder, or the killing of prisoners, or the
189
sacking of places, are proved upon them.”
Lieber argued that
this was the precedent of “the most humane belligerents in recent
190
times.”
These two theories were available to Lincoln when he
considered the cases of the Dakota warriors. Lincoln seemed to
have acted on both theories. In reviewing the cases, Lincoln made
a sharp distinction between Indian soldiers, who simply
participated in combat, and those who raped, killed women and
children, or killed prisoners. This last point would have been
particularly important to a careful and logical attorney like Lincoln.
If it was wrong—a war crime—for Indians to kill prisoners, then
would it not have been equally wrong—equally a war crime—for
the United States to execute prisoners?

186.
187.
188.

Id.
Id.
FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE
LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR, WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W.
HALLECK (1862), reprinted in HARTIGAN, supra note 181, at 31–44.
189. Id. at 20.
190. Id.
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VIII. “I COULD NOT AFFORD TO HANG MEN FOR VOTES.”

In the end, Lincoln was pulled in many directions by the
Dakota Rebellion. A humane chief executive, he was unable to
even consider the mass hanging of hundreds of men. The Civil
War was bloody enough, and there was no end in sight. Lincoln
had no stomach for what the generals and politicians in Minnesota
wanted. From the moment he heard of the push for mass
executions, he made it clear that he was skeptical about the idea.
The first word of mass executions reached Lincoln in midOctober. On October 9 General Pope informed General Halleck
that the “Sioux war may be considered at an end,” but that the
192
bloodletting was not over.
Pope reported that he had 1500
prisoners and that many of them were being “tried by military
193
commission . . . and will be executed.”
He reported he had
seized “a number of Winnebagoes” and that he had “destroyed all
194
the fields and property of the Sioux,” even though most of the
Sioux had not participated in the violence and the Winnebagoes
had not been involved at all. He told Halleck he planned to renew
his attacks on the Sioux in the spring and that “[t]he Indians are
195
greatly terrified.”
However we characterize the events of the fall
of 1862—insurrection, war, or rebellion—Pope was planning to
escalate the violence into what can only be described as a war of
genocide. For Pope the mass execution of prisoners was the
beginning of this process.
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton presented this report to
196
the Cabinet on October 14. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles
was “disgusted” with Pope’s report, the “tone” of which was
197
“discreditable.”
Welles noted that the Winnebagoes had “good
198
Welles also
land which white men want and mean to have.”
observed that there was nothing in the reports to indicate why this
violence had erupted, and he suspected—correctly—that the
Indians in Minnesota had some legitimate grievances.
191. Diary of Alexander Ramsey (Nov. 23, 1864), quoted in LINCOLN AND THE
INDIANS, supra note 1, at 118.
192. Letter from John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 9, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 722.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 171.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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We do not know what the rest of the cabinet thought about
this, but Lincoln immediately informed the military authorities that
there would be no hasty executions. A disappointed General Pope
told General Sibley that, “[t]he President directs that no executions
199
be made without his sanction.”
When the Dakota were
sentenced, Pope dutifully sent Lincoln a list of those to be
executed, and as we know, Lincoln immediately asked that all the
records of the trials be forwarded to him.
Meanwhile, Lincoln received letters from people in Minnesota,
mostly urging that the Dakota be executed. Governor Ramsey was
apoplectic when he contemplated that some might not be
executed. But he also offered Lincoln a way to avoid having blood
on his hands. Ramsey suggested: “If you prefer it turn them over to
200
me & I will order their Execution.”
Senator Wilkinson and the
state’s two congressmen pushed Lincoln hard for speedy
executions. Even Reverend Riggs, who urged Lincoln to “exercise
201
your clemency,” also expressed “a great necessity . . . to execute the
great majority of those who have been condemned by the Military
202
Commission.”
Bishop Whipple and other clergymen reminded Lincoln of the
corruption of the Indian system, the failure of the allotments to
arrive, and the real threat of starvation among the Indians. Their
desperate situation may not have justified killing civilians, but
going to war with the United States was not totally unjustified.
Lincoln also heard from William P. Dole, the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, whom he sent to Minnesota. Dole communicated to
203
Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith, who passed the letter on
204
In his
to Lincoln “concurring in the humane views” of Dole.
letter, Dole condemned the “indiscriminate punishment of men
who have laid down their arms and surrendered themselves as
205
prisoners.”
He suggested that the trials and the planned
199. Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), quoted in
LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 96.
200. Telegram from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 28, 1862),
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
201. Letter from Stephen R. Riggs to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 17, 1862), in
THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
202. Id.
203. Letter from William P. Dole to Caleb B. Smith (Nov. 10, 1862), in THE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
204. Letter from Caleb B. Smith to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in THE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
205. Letter from William P. Dole to Caleb B. Smith (Nov. 10, 1862), in THE
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executions were merely “revenge” rather than “the infliction of
deserved punishment,” and thus they were “contrary to the spirit of
the age, and our character as a great, magnanimous and christian
206
people.”
Dole urged Smith to pass his letter on to Lincoln to
“prevent the consummation of an act which I cannot believe would
be otherwise than a stain upon our national character, and source
207
of future regret.”
In pardoning the vast majority of those condemned to death,
Lincoln accepted the recommendation of his own Commissioner.
It dovetailed with his own persistent opposition to needless killing
and his lifelong commitment to due process of law. Lincoln was
doubtlessly shocked by the lack of specific evidence for many of
those convicted and the apparent unwillingness of the military to
even attempt to treat the prisoners individually and assess their
208
guilt or innocence on an individual basis.
In the early stages of
the trials, General Sibley had admitted that “the proceedings . . .
209
may not be exactly in form in all the details.” But this lack of due
process clearly did not bother him. Perhaps if a handful of Dakota
had been sentenced to death after such proceedings, as
210
Confederate guerillas had been in Missouri, Lincoln might not
have been too concerned either. But Lincoln refused to approve
the bloodbath that Sibley, Pope, and Governor Ramsey wanted on
the basis of such shoddy and suspect proceedings.
Lincoln’s decision to review the proceedings and spare the
lives of the overwhelming majority of those convicted also
comported with the emerging views of the War Department on the
role of law in military affairs. Lieber’s arguments about prisoners
of war and guerillas probably played into this. So too did the
realization that the nature of the Civil War itself was changing. On
August 17, Lincoln signed two laws that allowed for the enlistment
211
of black troops: The Second Confiscation Act and The Militia Act
212
A week later, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton
of 1862.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra note 34.
209. Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), in OFFICIAL
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 717.
210. Herbert, supra note 4, at 791–93 (discussing drumhead prosecutions and
summary executions of guerillas in Missouri).
211. Second Confiscation Act, Ch. 195, §11, 12 Stat. 589, 592 (1862).
212. Militia Act of 1862, Ch. 201, 12 Stat. 597, 598.
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authorized General Rufus Saxton, who was based at Hilton Head,
213
Now that the
South Carolina, to begin to enlist black troops.
United States was enlisting and training black soldiers, Lincoln had
to be even more concerned about the fate of captured prisoners.
Confederates might soon be seeking to execute or enslave black
soldiers they captured. This would turn the war into one of
unmitigated barbarism as the United States would then have to
retaliate by executing captured Confederates. These were real
possibilities.
Executing enemy soldiers—even Indian enemy
soldiers—was not only immoral, but it would set a dangerous
precedent. If Lincoln allowed the execution of Indian soldiers on
the grounds that the Indian attacks on the frontier were barbaric,
then the Confederates could respond that from their perspective
putting free blacks and former slaves in uniform and giving them
guns was also barbaric. The military and civilian authorities in
Minnesota wanted to execute the Dakota because they believed
such executions would prevent future frontier warfare and thus
save the lives of civilians and soldiers. But Lincoln’s view from the
White House was the opposite. Executing Indian prisoners of war
would only serve to justify Confederate executions of black U.S.
soldiers (and their white officers). Rather than saving lives, a mass
execution in Minnesota could have cost lives in the larger Civil War
that was most important to Lincoln.
On December 1, Lincoln asked Judge Advocate General
Joseph Holt, of the U.S. Army, for advice on how to deal with the
convicted men. He was clearly planning to pardon many of the
Indians. He asked Holt “whether I should conclude to execute
only a part of them, I must myself designate which, or could I leave
214
the designation to some officer on the ground?”
Holt replied
that day, telling the President he could not delegate his pardon
power “and that the designation of the individuals, which its
215
exercise involves, must necessarily be made by yourself.”
Holt
said that he knew of no instance where any president had
216
attempted “the delegation of this delicate and responsible trust.”
213. Letter from E. M. Stanton to Rufus Saxton (Aug. 25, 1862), in
14 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at
377–78.
214. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Joseph Holt (Dec. 1, 1862), in
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 140, at 537–38.
215. Letter from Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1862), in THE
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.
216. Id.
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Holt then made the observation that was obvious to others in the
administration, including Lincoln, that “[i]n view of the large
amount of human life involved in these proceedings, [it would] be
well—if this step has not already been taken—to submit them to
the Attorney General for the purpose of more satisfactorily
217
determining the question of their regularity.”
The point seems
clear: the leaders of the army were concerned about the lack of due
process, the rush to judgment, and the large amount of life at
stake. In the midst of America’s bloodiest war, even the leaders of
the army were concerned about executing more than 300 men
after trials that on their face were, at best, parodies of the legal
process.
Lincoln, following his own humanitarian instincts and his
lawyerly training, and backed by members of his cabinet, his
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Judge Advocate General
of the U.S. Army, moved to mitigate, as much as possible, the
barbarism of hanging more than 300 men, especially when it was
obvious many were not guilty of any crimes. Thus, the President
ordered his subordinates to divide the convicted Dakota into two
218
groups: those “who were proven to have participated in massacres”
219
which were “distinguished from participation in battles.” In doing
so, Lincoln was forced to accept some of the findings of the military
commission, even though he knew those hearings were deeply
flawed and jurisprudentially scandalous. Carol Chomsky argues
that Lincoln’s “judgments” to allow any executions were
220
But this
“questionable” because all the trials were “flawed.”
argument ignores the fact that some of those executed had openly
bragged about killing civilians, and that some of the evidence for
what amounted to war crimes was persuasive and compelling.
Moreover, in the world of 1862, with the Civil War raging, with a
miniscule staff, and the issues of the real war constantly pressing
him, Lincoln may have done as much as he could have done—and
spent as much time as he could afford—to correct the miscarriage
of justice that took place in Minnesota.
Furthermore, Lincoln tried to balance justice with military
concerns, issues involving the ongoing War of the Rebellion, and
fear of renewed violence in Minnesota. As he told the Senate, he
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Message of the President, supra note 7, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
Chomsky, supra note 3, at 15.
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was “[a]nxious to not act with so much clemency as to encourage
another outbreak, on the one hand, nor with so much severity as to
221
be real cruelty, on the other.” In the end, he spared seven out of
every eight of the convicted men. In hindsight, he should have
pardoned more and required new trials—fair trials—for those
222
going to the gallows.
Clearly, Lincoln and his advisors
understood the many problems with the trials and the lack of due
process. But the lack of due process for those who were executed
was swallowed up by the complexities of the Civil War, the distance
between Washington and St. Paul, and the myriad of other
demands on Lincoln’s time and attention. In December 1862 he
had other things on his mind—the ongoing campaign against the
Confederacy and the implementation of the final Emancipation
Proclamation on January 1, 1863. Thus, on December 6, he sent
223
General Sibley a list of forty men who would be executed. By the
time of the executions this would be reduced to thirty-eight, as two
more men were reprieved.
Lincoln expected there would be a huge political cost for this
massive commutation. Lincoln may have allowed a certain amount
of rough justice, and rough injustice, to settle the matter, but he
fully understood that his massive commutation—which would
effectively be a massive pardon—would probably not satisfy the
demands for vengeance and mass executions in Minnesota. But,
Lincoln was willing to accept these political costs because the
alternative was to acquiesce in the executions of over 300 men,
most of whom had not committed any recognizable crime.
Ultimately, the political cost turned out to be not as great as
Lincoln feared. Minnesota troops would continue to fight bravely
and gallantly against the Confederacy. The people of Minnesota
would remain mostly loyal to the Union cause. In 1864, Lincoln
would carry Minnesota by 7000 votes. This was not as large as his
10,000 vote victory in 1860, and given that the state had a larger
population by 1864, the decline in his margin of victory was even
greater. He had carried 63.5 percent of the popular vote in 1860
221. Message of the President, supra note 7, at 1.
222. At least one Dakota scholar sees the executions as “a political decision in
order to appease the angry and vengeful Minnesota citizens.” Interview by
Deborah Locke with Dr. Eldon Lawrence, in New Ulm, Minn. (Apr. 12, 2011)
(transcript available at http://collections.mnhs.org/cms/web5/media.php?pdf
=1&irn=10248274).
223. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Henry H. Sibley (Dec. 6, 1862), in
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 140, at 543.
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but only 59.1 in 1864.
This decline was noticeable, but hardly a
threat to Lincoln or his party’s power in the state. After the results
were in, Alexander Ramsey, who by then was a U.S. Senator, told
Lincoln “that if he had hung more Indians, we should have given
225
him his old majority.”
It is difficult to know if Ramsey was
226
attempting to make a joke, or if he was offering serious political
advice. Lincoln replied with a more sober point that reflected his
own legal and moral standards: “I could not afford to hang men for
227
votes.”

224. Ctr. for the Study of Politics and Governance, Minnesota Presidential
Election Results, 1860–2008, HUMPHREY SCH. PUB. AFFAIRS 8–9, http://www.hhh.umn
.edu/centers/cspg/research/election_data_archive/pdf/MN_Presidential
_Election_Results.pdf.
225. Diary of Alexander Ramsey (Nov. 23, 1864), quoted in LINCOLN AND THE
INDIANS, supra note 1, at 118.
226. See id.
227. Id.
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